# THE TRUTH-VALUE OF BUDDHIST LOGIC: IN THE FLOW OF QUADRILEMMA, DIALETHEISM, LEM AND BIVALENCE

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It is dogmatic to hold that quadrilemma (*catuṣkoṭi*) is the logical position of Buddhism regarding truth-value. Some further state that the Buddha rejects even quadrilemma and holds no logical position, which is also not tenable referring to some canonical evidences. In fact, in early Buddhism quadrilemma appears to be an examination of four possibilities in a given statement rather than a 'logical analysis' as some would suggest. Nāgarjuna in effect advocates certain variety of quadrilemma with four logical forms as $A, \neg A, A \wedge \neg A, \neg (A \vee \neg A)$. Further analysis in the same line shows the dialetheism in the Buddhist philosophy of *śūnyatā* with respect to contradiction of truth-values, particularly in third and fourth alternatives of quadrilemma. However, when we come to Buddhist logic of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, bivalence is enjoyed in terms of logical position of truth-values in Buddhism with indirect reference to LEM (law of excluded middle). This position can also be fortified with canonical explanations of early Buddhism. Since all of these positions come in the same flow of Buddhism, apparently many-valued position of quadrilemma seems to be refuted in Buddhist logic, which shows inconsistency in interpreting Buddhist philosophical position regarding truth-value. This paper attempts to resolve this apparent inconsistency and find possible position in line with Buddhist logic.

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